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1. Introduction 
 
This paper assesses the evolution of long-run total factor productivity (TFP) dynamics after a 
significant collapse of GDP and its associated welfare impact, measured by the resulting gap 
between actual and counterfactual levels of TFP. We focus on the TFP gap instead of the GDP 
gap in order to leave aside gross output reductions associated with lower factor accumulation. 
Thus, the TFP gap is a measure of efficiency costs directly linked to welfare losses, net of 
investment costs in factor accumulation. Clearly, the potential welfare costs of a GDP collapse 
will depend critically on the persistence of the subsequent TFP gap: i.e., the faster the recovery 
in productivity, the lower the welfare cost. Given our focus on welfare costs, we are particularly 
interested in exploring the conditions and shocks under which a GDP collapse is associated with 
a very persistent—possibly permanent—decline in aggregate productivity.   
This focus on TFP jibes well with the well-established finding that TFP is the main 
determinant of economic development in the long run (e.g,. see Easterly and Levine, 2001). For 
example, the empirical evidence of growth accounting exercises shows that a systematic shortfall 
in TFP growth is the main factor behind the widening gap in per capita income between Latin 
America and developed countries over the past 50 years (Blyde and Fernández-Arias, 2005). 
This is also consistent with the evidence compiled by Kehoe and Prescott (2007) that changes in 
TFP are the main driver of the 16 great depressions during the twentieth century studied in their 
book. While these papers basically perform an accounting exercise, in most cases the implicit 
causality goes from TFP shocks to output performance. A mechanical interpretation of our focus 
on the evolution of TFP after an output collapse could suggest an implicit causality in the 
opposite direction, but we acknowledge that causality could run both ways, as pointed out by 
Cerra and Saxena (2008). 
While we explore the causal interpretation of growth collapses leading to persistent 
productivity effects by specifically looking at a subsample of collapse episodes generated by 
exogenous factors, by and large we take an agnostic approach.
1 Therefore, the main contribution 
                                                           
1 An alternative approach to avoid some of these endogeneity problems would be to focus on TFP collapses. 
However, in our sample all output collapses would also classify as TFP collapses for the same threshold. 
Furthermore, given that TFP is computed as Solow residuals, it tends to be more volatile and noisy, such that for a 
given threshold there tend to be more “false” episodes, which makes the focus on output collapses more appealing. 
Finally, the literature the paper relates to has been focusing on the dynamics of macroeconomic variables after 
output collapses, such that for comparability it is useful to concentrate on output collapses.    5
of the paper is to explore the productivity dynamics after an output collapse and the transmission 
channels at work.  
If collapses are associated with detrimental persistent effects on the level of TFP, then 
they may lead to a lower average growth rate of GDP over long periods of time. If so, output 
shocks may generate a widening income gap between those countries that experience many of 
them and those that do not on account of those countries with incomplete TFP recovery within 
the sampling period. In particular, a permanently lower level of TFP would translate into a 
permanent effect on the level of GDP and, therefore, a reduction in long-term growth rates. If 
sharp output collapses are associated with persistent declines in TFP, they could be an important 
factor behind the absolute income divergence that has been observed in the world according to 
Pritchett (1997). 
Our methodological approach is based on a characterization of the anatomy of events and 
an exploration of some factors that have a significant correlation with the magnitude and 
duration of the decline in TFP. This alternative to the standard cross-country panel approach 
used in the empirical growth literature has received some attention in recent times due to the 
methodological shortcomings of cross-country regressions and their disappointing results in 
terms of policy evaluation. For example, Pritchett (2000) points out that systematic differences 
across countries in volatility and trends of GDP series make cross-country growth regressions 
essentially uninformative, while an approach that establishes some stylized facts by analyzing 
episodes and events associated with surges or collapses of output might be more enlightening (on 
growth accelerations see, among others, Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik, 2005, as well as Jones 
and Olken, 2008, on accelerations and decelerations).  
From a theoretical point of view, once market equilibrium in factor accumulation and 
utilization is restored after an output collapse, the existence of permanent income effects depends 
on the resulting steady-state aggregate productivity or TFP. In fact, if steady-state productivity 
remains unchanged, then growth rates would be altered during the period of collapse and 
recovery but the (average) long-term growth rate over this cycle would not. Consequently, 
welfare costs would be limited, associated with the transitory cyclical downturn. By contrast, if 
the collapse is associated with a decline in steady-state TFP, that is to say, if there is 
“productivity destruction,” then income would be reduced permanently and welfare costs would 
not be confined to a transition period but would continue accruing permanently.    6
In the framework of a neoclassical growth model, an output collapse may be caused by an 
exogenous collapse in TFP or by shocks to distortions on investment and utilization of physical 
capital and other inputs, called “wedges” in the literature (see Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan, 
2007), with no permanent effect on productivity. By contrast, endogenous growth theory 
provides a better framework to understand the potential mechanisms by which output collapses, 
whatever their cause, could have a permanent impact on TFP. In these models, an output collapse 
may erode the fundamentals behind aggregate TFP, thus lowering trend GDP. Furthermore, in 
some endogenous growth models a collapse may actually diminish the steady-state rate of 
growth of TFP and consequently of GDP, further reducing trend GDP and increasing the welfare 
cost.
2 
A number of endogenous growth models could account for a permanent effect on TFP 
following an output shock. For example, in models of knowledge accumulation, like Romer 
(1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), a reduction in the fraction of the labor force engaged 
in Research and Development (R&D) could have permanent negative effects on the level of 
productivity. Moreover, if the production of new knowledge depends largely on the stock of 
existing knowledge, the growth rate of productivity could also be permanently affected. 
Therefore, in these models, shocks that affect the return of the factors engaged in R&D relative 
to those engaged in the production of final goods could have potential long-standing 
consequences on productivity. Martin and Rogers (1997) employ an endogenous growth model 
in which labor productivity is augmented through learning by doing to show that recessions are 
periods in which opportunities for acquiring experience and improving productivity are foregone. 
Even if productivity growth resumes after a recession, there would be a permanent wedge in the 
level of productivity. 
There is a growing literature studying the role of policy distortions and TFP (see, for 
example, Parente and Prescott, 2000). Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), for example, develop a 
model of firm heterogeneity in which policies that distort the relative price faced by individual 
firms can result in large declines of aggregate productivity due to the misallocation of resources. 
Although not directly related to recessions, the model implies that if crises lead to an upsurge in 
those distortionary policies, aggregate TFP and output could be significantly affected in the long 
                                                           
2 In addition, the steady-state TFP level usually is a determinant of the steady state growth rate in these models, such 
that a permanent level effect could potentially also have a deteriorating effect on the steady state growth rate of 
output.   7
run. The facts show that governments often use subsidies, tariffs and quotas, undervalued 
exchange rates or other policies after recessions to revitalize output and employment. Although 
such policies can ignite the economy in the short run, they may also hinder aggregate efficiency 
in the long run to the extent that they are not removed and lead to misallocation of resources. 
Furthermore, output collapses might be accompanied by institutional and social breakdowns, 
which may destroy the intangible “capital” needed for efficient economic cooperation.  
There is another strand of the literature that shows that economic crisis may have positive 
impacts on TFP. Following Schumpeter’s notion of creative destruction, Caballero and 
Hammour (1994), for example, show that recessions may cleanse the economy of inefficient 
firms, leading to higher productivity and output growth. A related idea is the “pit-stop” view of 
recessions, according to which recessions are seen as times when profitability is low and, 
therefore, much needed restructuring can be undertaken because of a temporarily low 
opportunity cost (Aghion and Saint-Paul, 1991).
3 Rancière et al. (2007) present evidence that 
countries which have suffered occasional crises—identified as a sharp collapse in credit 
growth—grow faster. They also present a model consistent with a positive correlation between 
risk and economic growth under certain conditions. In addition, there is also a political economy 
argument for a positive effect of crises on growth. For example, Tommasi and Velasco (1996) 
argue that economic crises facilitate economic reforms.
4  
As the discussion above shows, in theory it is possible that output collapses are 
associated with positive or negative effects on productivity that last for long periods of time or 
even permanently. As an empirical matter, there are a number of papers in the literature that 
address related issues. Cerra and Saxena (2008) use panel VAR techniques to show that GDP 
growth is significantly and persistently lower after financial crises and some types of political 
crises. Our work is complementary to their, given that they do not explore whether this persistent 
decline in growth is due to a decline in factor accumulation or mainly due to a lower TFP 
growth.  
Jones and Olken (2008) identify episodes of GDP growth accelerations and collapses 
using a small-sample version of a structural break tests by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) to detect 
                                                           
3 Empirically, however, there is evidence that this restructuring process does not always occur. For example, using 
data on US manufacturing firms, Caballero and Hammour (2005) show that the restructuring process is depressed, 
not increased, by an aggregate recessionary shock.   8
regime changes. They identify 73 breaks in 48 countries using Penn World Table data, of which 
43 are down-breaks and 30 up-breaks. Their results show interesting asymmetries between 
growth ignitions and collapses. In particular, while growth accelerations are associated with 
increased trade, without a significant change in investment rates, collapses in GDP growth are 
associated with a significantly lower investment, inflation, devaluations and internal conflict.  
Our approach differs in various aspects from this paper. We concentrate on the question 
of whether TFP returns to it potential level taking into account initial conditions and the 
evolution of the TFP frontier. More than 62 percent of all the collapses identified by Jones and 
Olken (2008) occurred in the 1970s during the global productivity slowdown of the world 
economy. This suggests that—especially for developing countries—it is important to take into 
account what happens to the technological frontier in order to construct the level of TFP that 
would have prevailed in the absence of a crisis. Second, we focus on output collapses, defined as 
a large departure below the trend level of GDP, rather than growth collapses, which can be the 
natural consequence of an unsustainable boom, without implying a major crisis with destructive 
potential. Furthermore, we identify the events as a decline below a common threshold for all 
countries. This has the advantage that we capture all large events, rather than relying on a 
statistical identification of events that depends critically on the variability of the time series. This 
limitation explains why important crises, like the Argentinean, Uruguayan and Chilean currency 
and banking crises in the early 1980s, Argentina’s collapse during the hyperinflation of 1989, or 
Chile’s collapse around the rise and fall of the Allende regime, are not identified as episodes 
using Jones and Olken’s methodology.  
Several additional papers look at growth performance during extreme events, although 
without reference to productivity or other structural underpinnings relevant for long-run effects 
on income and welfare which are the focus of our paper. For example, similar to Jones and 
Olken (2008), Berg, Ostry and Zettelmeyer (2006) and Hausmann, Rodríguez and Wagner 
(2006) analyze the factors related to the duration of growth spells or collapses. Becker and 
Mauro (2006) analyze episodes of output drops but their main concern is on the nature of the 
shocks behind these drops rather than on the evolution of productivity. We use several of their 
classifications of shocks to analyze whether the evolution of TFP differs according to the type of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 In a related paper, Drazen and Easterly (2001) test the hypothesis that macroeconomic crises induce growth 
acceleration but fail to find significant effects.   9
shocks associated with the output collapse. Hong and Tornell (2005) analyze the recovery of 
GDP growth during currency crises. They find that growth rates rapidly return to pre-crisis levels 
but may not surpass them, thus possibly producing a persistent effect on GDP levels, but in 
contrast to our paper, they focus on cyclical GDP dynamics during currency crises. Finally, our 
paper is also somewhat related to Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2006) on the dramatic recoveries 
that can follow systemic financial crises. However, their emphasis is on the short-run or cyclical 
performance of TFP during systemic sudden stops in capital flows to emerging markets, while 
we focus on the long-run or permanent consequences of a broader class of output collapses.  
We look at a panel of 71 countries (listed in Table 1) during the period 1960-2003 to 
identify episodes of GDP collapses and estimate the counterfactual post-collapse TFP trend. We 
test whether output collapses are systematically associated with temporary or permanent declines 
of aggregate productivity and measure their welfare costs in terms of GDP forgone. Although 
results differ across countries and regions, the analysis shows that the losses from productivity 
destruction can be substantial. In addition, we characterize the types of shocks that are associated 
with output collapses and quantify the attendant welfare losses. For the sake of completeness, we 
also explore the behavior of factor accumulation after a collapse.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and identifies the output 
collapses in the sample. The next section constructs the counterfactuals of trend TFP and tests 
whether the effects on productivity after collapses are temporary or permanent. It also analyzes 
how these effects differ across time and regions. In Section 4 we explore how productivity 
effects differ depending on the types of shocks associated with output collapses. Section 5 
estimates the extent of the post-collapse loss in terms of the welfare costs as well as the reduction 
in GDP per capita due to productivity and investment effects.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Identification of Output Collapses 
 
The main focus of the paper is the behavior of TFP in the long run. Therefore, our sample 
comprises countries for which we could construct long series of GDP, physical capital, labor 
inputs and education. The sample consists of 71 countries, which is the maximum number of 
countries with available information, for the period 1960-2003. The real GDP (PPP-adjusted) 
and investment data are taken from the Penn World Table 6.2.  Capital stocks are constructed 
using the perpetual inventory method, as it standard in the literature, following the   10
parameterization of Easterly and Levine (2001). The labor input is measured by the labor force, 
also from the Penn World Table 6.2. We follow Hall and Jones (1999) and construct series for 
the relative efficiency of a unit of labor based on years of education. The data on education is 
taken from the Barro and Lee dataset (see Appendix A.1 for more details).  
The TFP series are computed for each country as a residual from the following Cobb-
Douglas production function:  
 
α α − =
1 ) (hL AK Y   ,       ( 1 )  
 
where Y represents domestic output, K physical capital, L labor force, h the average quality of the 
labor force and A is TFP.  
 
Collapses in Output 
 
There is no unique way to identify collapses in output. We consider that an economy has 
experienced a collapse when its output falls significantly below its potential or trend level.
5 An 
alternative approach would be to look at a collapse in the growth rate. However, a large negative 
growth rate of output is not necessarily an indication of a crisis, as the economy might be 
returning to its equilibrium after a period of unusually high growth. Our definition of collapse (a 
substantial negative gap between the observed output level and its potential or trend level) 
excludes these episodes.
 For example, if we define a growth collapse as a decline in real GDP 
growth by more than two standard deviations from the country’s average growth rate, out of 80 
episodes of this type in our sample only 27 are also output collapses in our definition.  
In order to calculate the relevant output gap, we first de-trend GDP per capita on a 
country-by-country basis using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Then we identify and select only 
output gaps that are 6% or larger,
6 which is also the average decline in GDP growth rates for the 
collapses identified by Jones and Olken (2008) using time-series structural break tests by 
country. As pointed out above, the advantage of a uniform threshold across countries is that this 
procedure makes sure that our events are “large” from an economic point of view. In contrast, if 
we were to consider extreme events from a statistical point of view on a country-by-country 
                                                           
5 A similar definition is used in Bergoeing, Loayza and Repetto (2004). 
6 The selection of the threshold is somewhat arbitrary. However, we chose 6 percent after analyzing results with 
other thresholds. For example, with values larger than 6 percent some of the well-known episodes of collapses (like 
Argentina in 1982) were missed.   11
basis, e.g. events that fall below two or three standard deviations, economically small collapses 
in countries with very low volatility would be identified as events, while large crises might go 
undetected in countries with high output volatility. 
Table 2 shows the collapses by countries and years. A total of 69 collapses were found, of 
which only two were in developed countries (Finland, 1992, and Iceland, 1969). All the other 
collapses were found in developing countries. Figure 1 shows the number of collapses by 
regions. Latin America (LAC) and Africa (AFR) were the regions with the greatest number of 
collapses, followed by the Asian countries (ASIA), OTHER (which includes developing 
countries in Europe and Israel) and, finally, the developed or industrial countries (IND). It should 
be pointed out that the average real GDP growth rate during a year where an output collapse 
takes place is –8.7 percent, such that if a growth episode were defined by a substantial negative 
growth rate, most output collapses would also fulfill this definition. In addition, there is only one 
output collapse that does not show a negative growth rate in the year of an output collapse: 
Cameroon in 1977. 
Focusing on the subset of developing countries, Figure 2 shows the frequency of output 
collapses by region. We find that the typical Latin American country experienced almost two 
collapses over the course of four decades. A similar frequency is found in Africa. However, for 
the typical country in the other developing-country regions the frequencies is about half of that 
or even lower (as in the case of Asia). The 1980s is the decade with the greatest number of  
collapses (shown in Figure 3). The number of collapses during this decade more than doubles the 
number of collapses in the 1960s, 1970s or the 1990s. Figure 4 shows that this “anomaly” of the 
1980s is mainly the result of a disproportionate occurrence of collapses in Latin American during 
this period. No other region experienced such a large difference in the number of collapses 
between the 1980s and other decades. 
Another interesting insight can be found by exploring the relationship between output 
collapses and output booms. Applying our definition of collapses symmetrically, we consider 
booms as periods in which the economy experiences a rise in output to a level that is 
significantly above its trend. Thus, it is possible to analyze if collapses follow periods of booms. 
In context of our analysis, if collapses are systematically preceded by booms, one could argue 
that periods of unusually strong economic expansion could be potentially very disruptive to the 
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economy down the road, and counterproductive in net terms. Some of the basic results on the 
relationship between booms and preceding collapses are shown in Table 3. Most of the output 
collapses are not preceded by booms, and the vast majority of booms are not followed by 
collapses.  Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that booms are not a factor contributing 
to costly collapses, an issue we analyze later. 
Now that we have identified the output collapses in the sample we are in a position to 
analyze how TFP behaves afterwards. This is done in the next section. 
 
3. TFP after Output Collapses 
 
The main objective of this section is to find out whether output collapses are associated with 
persistent, possibly permanent effects on aggregate productivity. Therefore, we construct 
counterfactuals of post-collapse TFP to compare with “actual”, i.e. measured, TFP.
7 As we are 
interested in making predictions of what would have been the TFP of a country had the collapse 
not occurred, the models are estimated using only country data prior to the collapse. 
The simplest counterfactual model would be linear growth forecasts of the TFP level over 
time t for each country i (which we refer to as the “linear model”): 
 
it i i it t TFP ε β α + + = ) ln(      (2) 
 
However, a counterfactual forecast based on such a model would fail to detect systemic 
changes over time in the rate of growth of world productivity that may influence each country’s 
potential TFP. A slowdown or an acceleration of the productivity frontier that may have occurred 
after the collapse could influence the post-collapse evolution of TFP. In order to account for this 









t TFP refers to the TFP of the productivity frontier and is proxied by the simple average of 
TFP for the 20 developed countries in the sample. This is our “baseline” model.  
                                                           
7 In what follows we refer to measured TFP as “actual” TFP in order to distinguish it from its counterfactual. 
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Alternatively, we also consider a model that only includes the evolution of the 
productivity frontier allowing for country-specific absorption, in the spirit of Parente and 








t i i it TFP t TFP ε λ β α + + + = ) ln( ) ln(    (5) 
 
We refer to these alternative models as the “country-specific absorption” and “country-specific 
absorption with trend” model, respectively. 
Given that in all of these specifications we are assuming a trend-stationary process in 
order to compute the counterfactual for TFP, it is important to check whether this assumption is 
supported by the data. In order to do so, in Table 4 we perform several panel unit root tests 
considering alternative specifications. As can be seen in the table, considering the Maddala and 
Wu (1999) test, as well as Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), Pesaran (2003) and Levin, Lin and Chu  
(2002), they all show that the TFP series are trend stationary at standard levels of confidence. 
Thus, the data support the type of counterfactual specified above. 
Countries with more than one episode of output collapse should also have one 
counterfactual path for TFP for each collapse. Therefore, for the purpose of estimating the 
counterfactual models presented above, the index i refers to each episode, possibly in the same 
country. All the episodes are estimated using data from the beginning of the sample until the year 
prior to the collapse, which is consistent with the null hypothesis that collapses do not have 
persistent effects on TFP. 
Because some of the collapses occurred very early in the sample period, the lack of 
adequate numbers of observations precluded our estimation of some of the counterfactuals. In 
some other cases, such as Argentina 2002, the collapse occurred only 1 or 2 years before the end 
of the sample period. For these particular cases, making a comparison after such a short period of 
time would bias the results towards a “lack of recovery” type of story. Therefore, we also 
eliminated episodes that took place within less than four years of the end of our sample. After 
these adjustments, we are left with 56 collapses for which we estimated counterfactuals. Table 5 
shows the regression results for the alternative models of TFP corresponding to equations (2) - 
(5). Figures A.1 to A.36 in the Appendix depict all the cases when we use our baseline model   14
(i.e., the predicted TFP levels based on the estimation of equation 3). We estimate the models by 
GLS using the Prais-Winsten correction to allow for first-order autocorrelation in the error term.  
Given that we are interested primarily in long-run effects, we would like to compare the 
actual level of the TFP of a country that has collapsed with its counterfactual at the farthest 
possible moment of time after the collapse has occurred, that is, at the end of our sample period 
or just before another collapse occurred. Hence, for each episode we construct the log-difference 
of actual TFP versus its counterfactual and then test if on average this difference is significantly 
different from 0. The results are shown in Table 6. It is important to point out that the level of 
TFP in any specific year could be unusually high or unusually low because our measure of TFP 
is affected by the business cycle, which introduces noise to the tests. Therefore, we compare the 
counterfactual in a particular year not with measured TFP in that year but with its trend.
8 
The first column in Table 6 shows the case when counterfactuals are estimated with the 
baseline model. On average, actual TFP ratio is around 12 percentage points below its 
counterfactual at the end of the sample. In addition, the t-statistic shows that the null hypothesis 
of no significant difference is rejected at standard levels of confidence. Thus, typically TFP does 
not return to pre-collapse levels. It is worth noting that the end-of-sample period is, on average, 
15.2 years after the collapses have occurred. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that the failure of 
TFP to return to its potential level is due to the lack of time to recover within the sample. In 
order to explore this issue further, in Figure 5 we plot the log-difference between actual and 
counterfactual TFP at the end-of-sample against the years left to reach the end of sample for each 
episode. As clearly seen in the scatter plot, there is a slightly positive correlation of 0.18, but it is 
not significant at conventional levels (its p-value is 0.23). Thus, a systematic bias due to sample 
truncation does not seem to be driving our results regarding lack of recovery in TFP. 
Furthermore, even if we were to consider the point estimates as significant, they imply that it 
would take around 45 years to close the gap between actual and counterfactual TFP. 
The next three columns in Table 6 show the results for the alternative models for the 
computation of TFP counterfactuals. Although the values vary slightly, overall these alternative 
models confirm qualitatively the previous result. In all three cases, actual TFP ends up 
significantly below the level of TFP that would have prevailed if the collapse had not occurred. 
                                                           
8 The trend is calculated with the Hodrick-Prescott filter applied to the entire TFP series, using a smoothing 
parameter of 6.25 suggested by Uhlig and Ravn (2002). The results do not change qualitatively when the original 
series are considered as alternative.   15
Therefore, when we consider all the models, the results indicate that output collapses have been 
followed by very persistent negative effects on productivity. This evidence is consistent with the 
findings of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), which show a higher incidence of structural breaks in 
TFP trends in developing countries compared to industrialized countries. 
Table 7 shows the same exercise by main regions of developing countries, Latin 
America, Asia, and Africa respectively. In the case of Latin America, all models to construct 
TFP counterfactuals clearly support the argument that TFP failed to return to its potential trend 
after an output collapse. For the cases of Asia and Africa, however, the results are mixed. In the 
case of Asia, we do not find any evidence of a permanent and significant permanent reduction of 
TFP, while for Africa it depends on the method used to compute TFP counterfactuals.
9 Thus, 
while we find strong evidence that collapses have generated long-run detrimental effects on 
productivity in Latin America, the evidence is somewhat inconclusive for Africa and rather weak 
for Asia.
10 
A sketch of TFP evolution around collapses in the three regions is shown in Figure 6. We 
plot the log difference between actual TFP relative to its counterfactual not only at the end of the 
sample period but also when this ratio reached its minimum. The graph shows the averages of 
these points for each of the regions. All three regions exhibit a similar pattern of falling TFP and 
subsequent recovery. The Latin American average, however, not only shows the smallest 
recovery (as already shown in the previous tables), but also the largest fall. The figure also shows 
that the aftermath of output collapses on productivity has been on average more destructive in 
Latin American than in the other regions at all times, which suggests that long-run consequences 
may require sufficiently deep crises to materialize. 
Next, we explore some conditions under which collapses entail long-run TFP effects, 
which may explain why TFP destruction is more prevalent in Latin America.  In order to do so, 
we first analyze whether there is a threshold effect so that TFP destruction materializes only 
when the collapse is sufficiently large. We explore whether, as suggested by Figure 7, the 
existence of a threshold effect helps explain the difference between the disruptive powers of 
                                                           
9 Of course, the results for Asia might be partially explained by the reduced number of episodes in our sample which 
excludes the crises in the region during 1997/1998. However, the strong recovery of GDP per capita in most 
countries since the crises suggests that overall effect of these episodes on TFP levels in Asia are rather limited. 
10 Our results from the linear model, although not strictly comparable, are in line with those in Cerra and Saxena 
(2008). They find that after a recession, output does not recoup the level associated with the linear extrapolation of 
the original trend.   16
collapses in Latin America relative to other regions. Table 8 shows the results when we consider 
a threshold of a 20 percent collapse to separate the collapses into two groups: a) strong collapses, 
in which difference between actual TFP relative to its counterfactual reached its minimum at a 
value greater than 20 percent in absolute value, and b) mild collapses, those episodes in which 
the observed TFP maximum shortfall was less than 20 percent in absolute value. For each group 
we test whether the log-difference between actual TFP relative to counterfactual TFP at the end 
of the sample period is equal to zero. 
The first column shows that there is evidence of a threshold effect: for the group of strong 
collapses we can reject the hypothesis that on average observed TFP recovers to its 
counterfactual level, but for the group of mild collapses we cannot reject it. Since most collapses 
in Latin America were strong (61 percent) while the opposite was true in Asia (only 20 percent) 
and Africa (47 percent), this threshold effect helps explain why Latin American collapses were 
found to be particularly destructive.  
The next two columns in Table 8 formalize this insight showing the same exercise as in 
column 1 but discriminating between Latin American and non-Latin American collapses. The 
results confirm the presence of a threshold effect for each group of countries. Therefore, even 
though the results from Tables 6 and 7 show little indication of permanent effects in TFP in the 
non-Latin American collapses, Table 8 establishes that strong collapses lead to persistent or 
permanent destruction everywhere. However, mild collapses still have some long-lasting effects 
in Latin America but not in non-LAC countries, which suggests that Latin  America is not only 
more prone to large output collapses but also less resilient. 
Finally, we test whether a preceding output boom is relevant for the destructive power of 
output collapses. Table 9 shows the results. The table presents the tests that the log-difference 
between actual TFP and the counterfactual TFP at the end of the sample period is zero for the 
collapses preceded by booms (first panel) and for the collapses not preceded by booms (second 
panel).  
While a preceding boom appears to be associated with less destructive collapses, this link 
is not the key to Latin America’s particularly destructive collapses. In fact, the second and third 
columns of Table 9 show that splitting the samples according to the incidence of output booms 
does not alter the finding that Latin American collapses have been, on average, associated with 
permanent reductions in TFP, regardless of whether the collapses were preceded by booms.  This   17
is consistent with the evidence provided by Berg, Ostry and Zettelmeyer (2006) that growth 
accelerations usually have not been sustainable in Latin America, while in other regions, 
especially Asia, growth spells have a longer duration and have not ended in crises or reversals. 
 
4. Exploring the Impact of Different Types of Shocks 
 
In this section, we explore a series of shocks that have been identified in the literature as 
important causes or correlates with economic crises. In particular, we first focus on the evolution 
of TFP after systemic sudden stops (3S) introduced by Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2006), 
hereafter referred to as CIT. These episodes are defined as a sharp current account reversal (more 
than two standard deviations) that also coincides with a spike in the aggregate spread of 
sovereign bonds over Treasuries (measured by JP Morgan’s EMBI spreads) for all emerging 
markets. The systemic nature of this type of shocks ensures the exogeneity of the output collapse 
and therefore puts to the test whether the findings of the previous section are purely driven by 
endogenous collapses in TFP. 
CIT focus on a group of emerging countries that are integrated into world capital markets 
and therefore potentially exposed to 3S events. Within this group they identify a sample of 16 
episodes of output collapses that occurred in the context of 3S as defined in their paper.  
It would be desirable to employ a sample of collapses that is as similar as possible to the 
one used in CIT. Our sample of collapses, however, only includes seven of the 16 episodes, 
primarily because CIT use a less stringent threshold for output drops than we do. To follow 
closely CIT, we also estimate counterfactuals for the other collapses in CIT for which we have 
data, which allows us to add five more episodes to reach 12.
11  
Next, we test whether these 12 collapses had, on average, temporary or permanent effects 
on productivity. Table 10 presents the results. For all four alternative measures of TFP 
counterfactuals, we find that TFP does not fully recover. With 95 percent confidence, we find 
that TFP fails to attain its pre-crisis path and therefore suffers permanent erosions.
12  
Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that for these episodes the average number of years after 
                                                           
11 The 12 collapses are: Argentina 82, Argentina 95, Brazil 83, Chile 83, Ecuador 99, Malaysia 98, Mexico 86, 
Mexico 95, Peru 83, Venezuela 83, Uruguay 83 and Thailand 98. The other two collapses took place in Turkey and 
Indonesia, which are countries not included in our dataset because of lack of data on capital and/or educational 
variables to compute the TFP residuals. 
12 Nevertheless, even in this worst case the extent of recovery appears quite high (98 percent on average). A formal 
analysis may very well conclude that 3S collapses are milder than other types.   18
a collapse is slightly below nine years, almost half the length of the period of the average 
collapse studied before. However, when we compare with the case of recent collapses in our 
sample taking place after 1980, with a recovery period of less than 14 years, the effects of 3S 
appear quite similar. Thus, even if lack of recovery is partly due to truncation in the case of 3S 
events, they appear similar to our events at large and it seems safe to conclude that negative 
effects on TFP of 3S collapses are at least quite persistent. 
In order to compare 3S episodes with other types of episodes more directly, we 
concentrate first on those events that are also an output collapse under our definition. There are 
seven episodes in our sample that are 3S and also an output collapse episode. As can be seen in 
the second panel in Table 9, the effects are slightly smaller under the baseline specification 
compared to the 3S cases analyzed before. In particular, at 95 percent confidence we cannot 
reject that these episodes are transitory, so that TFP returns to its previous level. However, this 
conclusion depends on the counterfactual model selected. For the other three models, TFP does 
not return to its counterfactual.  With our metric, there is no “Phoenix miracle” for TFP.  
More generally, we extend the analysis of 3S shocks and  look at how our conclusions on 
productivity destruction following an output collapse may differ depending on various 
characteristics of shock triggering the collapse (apart from the 3S episodes already analyzed). In 
order to do so, we considered a series of shocks that have been identified by the literature as 
sources for serious macroeconomic disturbances. The definitions and sources are similar to the 
shocks used by Becker and Mauro (2006).  
The first group of shocks we consider involves more exogenous economic shocks. First, 
we consider episodes of negative terms of trade shocks (TOT), represented by a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 when country’s TOT growth rate falls below two standard deviations. In 
addition, we also consider global external shocks such as oil shocks and increases in 
international interest rates. Oil shock episodes are identified as years in which the price increase 
of crude oil is greater than one standard deviation. The resulting years when oil shocks took 
place are 1974, 1979, 1999 and 2002.  International interest rate shocks are identified as years in 
which the effective Federal Funds rate increased by more than 150 basis points. Finally, the 
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natural disaster dummy is constructed based on data from EMDAT
13 and takes the value of 1 if 
more than a 0.01 percent of the country’s population was killed in the incident. 
The second group of shocks involves macroeconomic shocks that might be triggered by 
external events, but potentially also some domestic determinants, such as currency crises, 
banking crises and sovereign debt crises. A currency crisis is defined following Fernández-Arias, 
Panizza and Stein (2002) as a situation in which the real exchange rate depreciated by more than 
10 percent in any month, and is represented by a dummy variable taking the value of one in the 
year of the crisis.
14 For banking crises, we rely on episodes reported by Bell and Pain (2000), 
Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005), and Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999), while for the definition of the debt crisis we use episodes reported by 
Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001), Manasse and Roubini (2005), and Reinhart, Rogoff and 
Savastano (2003). 
Finally, a third group of variables includes political shocks such as wars and major 
regime changes (e.g., coups d’état). The war dummy takes the value of 1 if the country is 
involved in an internal or external war according to information from the Correlates of War 
database, while the political shock dummy is constructed as an event with a major regime change 
base on the Polity IV database.
15 
The degree of association of the different types of shocks with output collapses is shown 
in Table 11. With the above definition of shock, currency crises and international interest rate 
shocks are the most frequent shocks, while natural disasters and terms of trade shocks are the 
rarest events. However, when considering the conditional frequency of observing an output 
collapse given that a particular shock materializes, terms of trade shocks appear to be the most 
strongly associated with output collapses, while other types of shocks such as interest rate shocks 
are more noisy and less informative of a subsequent output collapse. This can also be seen when 
looking at the noise-to-signal ratio, which is defined as the ratio between false signals 
(proportion of times that a shock signals a crisis without an output collapse occurring) and good 
signals (proportion of times that a shock signals correctly a crisis). Clearly, it should be kept in 
                                                           
13 They are available at www.em-dat.net.  
14 This definition follows the spirit of Frankel and Rose (1996) who consider nominal depreciations. It takes into 
account that in high-inflation environments a high nominal depreciation does not necessarily reflect pressure on the 
currency. We also tried different thresholds, e.g., considering a five percent depreciation, and the results did not 
change significantly. 
15 We define this shock as a deterioration of 3 or more points in the country’s Polity index.   20
mind that the magnitudes of the different shocks are not strictly comparable. If these shocks were 
to be used to construct an early warning system, some normalization that would render the same 
conditional frequency of shocks would be needed. However, for our purpose of exploring the 
association with output collapses and the evolution of TFP, this is not strictly necessary. 
In Table 12, we test whether the permanent effects on TFP associated with output 
collapses depend on the type of the shock associated with the collapse. In order to perform these 
tests, we associate a shock with a collapse when it takes place in a one-year window around that 
collapse.
16 As can be seen in the table, there are significant differences across types of shocks 
regarding the severity of the associated collapse as well as the degree of persistence of the effects 
on TFP, but in all cases the estimated effect on long-run TFP is negative. The evidence on 
currency crises, debt shocks, and sudden increases in international interest rates, as well as 
natural disasters and wars, is strong enough to conclude that the negative effect on TFP is 
permanent. In particular, wars and natural disasters have on average the strongest impact. 
Interestingly, these shocks do not only reduce GDP per capita by destroying physical and human 
capital (which is to be expected during civil wars), but they also have a permanent effect in 
lowering TFP. On the other hand, political shocks, terms of trade shocks (including oil shocks), 
and banking crises may have only a transitory effect. Finally, the six episodes in our sample that 
are not associated with any of these types of shocks have only a transitory effect on TFP.
17  
While exploring the particular mechanisms through which these different shocks affect 
TFP is beyond the scope of the paper, it is important to note that the evidence provided in this 
section allows us to make some causal connections between output collapses caused by external 
events and the evolution of TFP. In this sense, collapses related to international financial market 
turmoil, like 3S or hikes in international interest rates, have significantly negative effects on 
long-run TFP. Furthermore, some of the propagation of these shocks might be through large 
swings in the real exchange rate and triggering debt crises as the literature on sudden stops 
emphasizes (e.g., see Calvo and Talvi, 2005), which are the precisely the macroeconomic shocks 
associated with persistent TFP declines.  
 
                                                           
16 While this helps to increase the number of collapses for each test, it is reasonable given that there might be timing 
problems in the year to which a particular crisis/shock is assigned. 
17 It should be kept in mind that these shocks are not orthogonal to each other. For example, out of the 107 debt 
crises identified in our sample, 65 were preceded or coincided with an interest rate shock. 
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5. The Costs of Productivity Losses 
 
In the previous sections we showed that output collapses are associated with persistent declines 
in aggregate productivity, particularly in Latin America. In this section we show that the costs of 
productivity drops in terms of GDP foregone can be substantial. Even if aggregate productivity 
recovers, the temporary productivity losses can be dear to the economy. Recovery from a 
collapse is a costly process that may require significant resource reallocation. Firms and entire 
sectors contract while others expand. Labor and capital are freed in some places to be used in 
others. All this transition may affect the aggregate efficiency of the economy until the process is 
completed. Therefore, even in the episodes in which aggregate TFP returns to its potential level 
the transition can be very costly. This is particularly true, of course, if the recovery takes a long 
period of time or never fully materializes, as appears to be the case in the Latin American 
experience. 
We can measure the ex post welfare cost of output collapses as the consumption forgone 
due to the reduction in productivity. Since TFP enters as a multiplicative terms in our production 
function (with an exponent equal to one), any reduction in TFP (in percentage terms) implies the 
same reduction in GDP and, for given factor accumulation, in consumption.
18 We will 
conservatively neglect welfare costs associated with lower factor accumulation on account of the 
lower returns brought by lower productivity as well as the decrease in investment due to more 
investment distortions, given that they do not have first-order effects on welfare.
19 
First, we calculate the direct output loss using the estimated TFP gap for each year after 
the collapse until TFP attains its counterfactual path. For the collapses in which TFP never 
reaches its counterfactual level, the cumulative output loss is calculated until the end of the 
sample period, 2003.
20 We express the cumulative output loss as a percentage of the GDP in 
2003. 
Figure 7 shows the results. It is clear that some of the collapses have entailed very large 
costs to countries, particularly those collapses leading to a permanent TFP shortfall. But even if 
productivity eventually reached its potential trend, the losses during the transition period have 
been significant in many cases. For example, after the collapse that Uruguay experienced in 
                                                           
18 The overall output forgone would amount to this direct output loss plus the indirect output foregone due to lower 
factor accumulation. 
19 This result follows directly from the envelope theorem. 
20 These cumulative losses are the simple sum, thus we do not compound or discount them.   22
1983, TFP returned to its potential trend after nine years (see Figure A.34) but still generated an 
accumulated loss to the country equivalent in value to its entire GDP in 2003.  
The output foregone computed so far are ex post measures of the costs of output 
collapses. However, it could be argued that given the low probability of these events, the ex ante 
welfare loss is considerably lower.
21  In order to assess the expected welfare loss due to GDP 
collapses, we proceed as follows.
22 First, we use the frequency of episodes as an estimate of the 
probability of a GDP collapse by region, separating Latin America and the rest of the world (in 
consonance with the different behavior of TFP effects in Latin America documented above). 
These probabilities of output collapse in a given year are presented in the first column of Table 
13. Next, we compute the discounted present value of the difference between actual GDP and 
counterfactual GDP assuming that the differences between actual and counterfactual TFP levels 
estimated in Tables 6 and 7 are maintained in the future. This assumption does not appear 
particularly restrictive given our previous analysis and upon inspection of TFP trajectories (see 
the Appendix). Then, we discount this loss by a real rate of 5 percent per annum.
23 Thus, the 
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where p is the probability of a collapse, r is the real interest rate, and the final term is the direct 
GDP loss incurred every year due to the difference between the observed level of TFP after the 
collapse and its counterfactual level. It should be pointed out that this is actually a lower bound 
of the ex ante welfare cost of growth collapses because we are not considering the indirect 
effects of a lower level of TFP on profitable factor accumulation, investment distortions, and 
transition costs. In addition, the consideration of risk aversion would also increase the measured 
welfare loss.  
The resulting magnitudes of multiplying this discounted present value by the probability 
of a collapse are presented in columns (2) – (4) of Table 14. The results indicate that the 
                                                           
21 This argument would be in the spirit of Lucas (1987), who argues that welfare losses in the United States due to 
business cycle fluctuations are small in economic terms. 
22 The estimate we are obtaining should be interpreted as the average expected output cost for a GDP collapse of 
similar characteristics to those observed in our sample. 
23  Observe that for developed countries usually the standard discount rate is between 2 percent and 3 percent, such 
that our estimated welfare losses are rather conservative.   23
expected welfare losses are large. In terms of contemporaneous GDP, for the whole sample 
output collapses imply an expected loss equivalent to almost 8 percent of GDP. For Latin 
America, a region with deeper crises and a higher likelihood of occurrence of a collapse, this cost 
is almost twice as large, over 14 percent of GDP.  
Clearly, these magnitudes are large. It is interesting to point out that our conservative 
estimates are similar to the welfare costs of rare disasters estimated by Barro (2006). Even 
neglecting transition and investment effects and without considering risk aversion, our welfare 
estimates of output collapses are larger than the standard welfare costs of eliminating 
fluctuations in consumption in developing countries, which according to Pallage and Robe 
(2003) are equivalent to around 0.34 percent of permanent consumption in developing 
countries.
24  
TFP reduction is a pure welfare cost, permanent in the case of TFP destruction and 
transitory if TFP eventually recovers after a transition. As mentioned earlier, lower investment 
commanded by lower TFP would not entail a net welfare cost as a first-order approximation. 
Similarly, lower investment on account of additional distortions to the incentives to invest (e.g., 
higher risk of expropriation) would also generate only second-order welfare costs measured in 
terms of consumption. Nevertheless, lower investment would have a first-order impact on output 
level and growth, traditional measures of countries’ performance. It may be interesting therefore 
to have a sense of the magnitude of investment effects on output and compare them with the pure 
productivity effect.   
 
Collapses and Investment 
 
The long-run decline in output level directly produced by the long-run TFP gap after output 
collapse utilized in (6) is about 12 percent, and as large as 19 percent in Latin America. Clearly, 
negative effects on factor accumulation leading to lower long-run output could also be associated 
with output collapses. Actually, if only TFP declined during an output collapse, physical capital 
and probably also human capital would fall due to the lower level of productivity, even in the 
absence of any association between output collapse and additional distortions in factor 
accumulation. Thus, it is difficult to assess the effects on factors, due to their endogeneity with 
respect to TFP.   24
The investment shortfall associated with a reduction in TFP can be estimated in the 
neoclassical framework as follows. Following Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005), the 
production function in equation (1) in per worker terms can be rewritten in “intensive” form, 
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Under the assumption that α = 1/3, the overall long-run output shortfall associated with a 
reduction in TFP is magnified to around 18 percent of GDP, and around 28 percent of GDP for 
the case of Latin America. In particular, the corresponding expected discounted output loss due 
to the endogenous investment reduction is about half of that directly associated with TFP: about 
12 percent of GDP, or 22 percent in the case of Latin America (see the last column in Table 13).  
One way to isolate pure effects on investment from these effects induced by productivity 
shifts is to look at the capital-output ratio or the steady-state investment-output ratio, which in 
the neoclassical growth model are independent of the level of TFP. In steady state, the following 
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where g is the steady state growth rate of TFP, n is the human-capital-adjusted population growth 
rate and δ the rate of depreciation of capital.  Thus, an analysis of the behavior of the investment-
output ratio after an output collapse is a simple test to see if factor accumulation plays a role 
beyond the indirect effects of TFP on factor accumulation. 
We explore this possibility in Table 14. In particular, following the same methodology as 
for TFP, we test whether the HP-filtered investment to GDP ratios at the end of the sample are 
significantly different from the investment to GDP ratio in the year before the collapse. The 
results show an average decline in the investment/GDP ratio by almost 1.5 percentage points of 
GDP after an output collapse, although it is only marginally significant (p-value of 0.07). 
Furthermore, in Latin America and Africa the decline in the investment-output ratio after an 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
24 In our metric the present discounted value (using a discount rate of 5 percent also) of these costs would be around 
4.8 percentage points of GDP (assuming that consumption is around 70 percent of GDP).   25
output collapse is not significant. This result is particularly interesting because Latin America 
and Africa to a certain extent are the regions that underperform in terms of TFP, while the other 
regions do not exhibit significant declines in TFP.  
If we accept the point estimate for this pure investment effect, assuming a growth rate of 
TFP of 2 percent per annum, population growth of 1 percent, a rate of depreciation of 7 percent 
and an initial capital-output ratio of 2, a decline in 1.5 percentage points of GDP in the 
investment-output ratio therefore implies a 15 percentage points, or 7.5 percent decline, in the 
capital-output ratio.  
Assuming a value of α = 1/3, this 7.5 percent decline in the capital-output ratio would 
imply a decline in GDP per worker of 3.75 percent.  
Overall, the results show that in addition to a persistent decline in TFP, output collapses 
have sometimes been accompanied as well by a decline in investment ratios, which could be 
linked to increases in investment distortions. However, the evidence on the latter is rather limited 
and their economic magnitude tends to be small. In particular, in Latin America TFP effects are 
very substantial (lower long-run GDP levels by 19 percent) and investment distortions effects are 
negligible. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper we analyze the dynamics of TFP after output collapses and estimate the implied 
welfare losses. Using a large panel of developed and developing countries we find that almost all 
of these collapses took place in developing countries. The typical Latin American country 
experienced about two collapses over the course of the four decades (similar to Africa but much 
higher than other regions).  
We find strong evidence of persistent productivity destruction in Latin America: the 
output collapses during the debt crisis in the 1980s meant more than a “lost decade” to the 
region. The evidence on the enduring impact of collapses on productivity for the other regions is 
weaker.  
We find empirical support to the notion of a threshold effect in the sense that TFP 
destruction materializes when the collapse is sufficiently large. Output collapses in Latin 
America have been particularly destructive of long-run productivity because they have been 
deeper than in other regions, not because aggregate productivity is less resilient.   26
These long-term TFP shortfalls after output collapses are not merely a reflection of 
productivity weaknesses prompting both. When we constrain the sample to output collapses 
caused by exogenous shocks, we still find a similarly negative impact on TFP. In particular, 
global capital market disruptions and domestic shocks related to sudden stops (such as real 
exchange rate and debt shocks) have the most destructive impact on TFP. The evidence suggests 
that there is irreversible productivity damage. 
Our analysis also shows that the welfare costs of productivity losses can be very 
substantial. Permanent effects on productivity entail permanently lower GDP and lower long-
term GDP growth. Even if the effects are temporary and aggregate productivity recovers after a 
period of decline, the costs associated with the temporary but persistent losses in productivity 
can be large for the economy. A conservative estimation of welfare cost associated with the 
possibility of an output collapse indicates that this contingency is more costly than the recurrent 
cost of business cycle fluctuations. 
From a policy perspective, these large welfare costs associated with output collapses 
indicate the importance of focusing macroeconomic policies in developing and emerging 
economies on crisis prevention and risk management rather than reducing business cycle 
fluctuations. This paper suggests that there is a big premium on prudent and conservative 
policies against the risk of an extreme output downfall.  
Finally, it is worth noticing that the prevalence of output collapses in Latin America and 
developing countries in general contributes to low long-run growth and lack of convergence. In 
fact, persistent productivity reduction after output collapse is responsible for long-run GDP 
levels that are 18 percent lower than they would be otherwise. Even without any additional 
deterioration from investment distortions, this reduction every 32 years (the observed frequency 
of output collapses) amounts to an average reduction of 0.6 percentage points of GDP per worker 
growth per annum.    27
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Appendix  
 
A.1. TFP Computation 
 
We construct series for capital stock using data from the Penn World Tables, Version 6.2. 
Following the methodology presented in Easterly and Levine (2001) we use a perpetual 
inventory method. In particular, the capital accumulation equation states that:   
 
t t t I K K + − = + ) 1 ( 1 δ ,       ( A . 1 )  
 
where Kt is the stock of capital in period t, I is investment and δ is the depreciation rate, which 
we assume equals 0.07. From the capital accumulation equation (A.1) and assuming that the 






k ,         ( A . 2 )  
 
where i is the average investment-output ratio for the first 10 years of the sample, and g is a 
weighted average between world growth (75 percent) of 4.2 percent and the average growth of 
the country for the first 10 years of the sample (25 percent). To obtain the initial capital stock K0 
we multiply k by the average output of the first three years of the sample.  
The series for labor is computed as the ratio of real GDP (Chain) using the data and real 
GDP per worker from the Penn World Tables 6.2.  
To estimate human capital, we follow Hall and Jones (1999) and consider h to be relative 
efficiency of a unit of labor with E years of schooling. Specifically, the function takes the form 
of:  
 
) (E e h
φ = ,         ( A . 3 )  
 
where the function  (.) φ is such that  (0) 0 φ =  and  () E φ′ is the Mincerian return on education. In 
particular, we approximate this function by a piece-wise linear function. We assume the 
following rates of return for all the countries: 13.4 percent for the first four years of schooling, 
10.1 percent for the next four years and 6.8 percent for education beyond the eighth year (based   32
on Psacharopoulos, 1994). For each country we compute the average using the data on years of 
schooling in the population from the Barro-Lee database.
25   






α − ⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
,        ( A . 4 )  
 
where A represents the total factor productivity (TFP) and α is 1/3. TFP is obtained by applying 
logs: 
 




) ln( ) 1 ( )) ln( ) (ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( h L K L Y A α α − − + − − =  (A.6) 
 
Finally, computed TFP levels are given by: 
 
() ) ln( ) 1 ( )) ln( ) (ln( ) ln( ) ln( exp h L K L Y A α α − − + − − =  (A.7) 
 
 
A.2. Derivation of Steady-State Investment Equation 
 
For simplicity let us use continuous time, such that the transition equation for the capital stock is 
given by: 
 
K I K δ − = &         ( A . 8 )  
 










        ( A . 9 )  
 
Given the production function Y=K
α(AhL)
1-α, steady state output growth is given by: 
 
                                                           
25 Linear extrapolations are used to complete the five-year data. 
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    (A.10) 
 
where g is the growth rate of TFP and n is the growth rate of human-capital adjusted labor (hL). 
The second equality comes from the fact that on the balanced growth path, the capital-to-output 
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Table 1.  Countries in the Sample 
 
Industrial  Latin America and 
Caribbean   Africa   Asia   Other  
Australia Argentina  Benin  Fiji  Cyprus 
Austria Bolivia Botswana  Hong  Kong  Greece 
Belgium Brazil  Cameroon  India  Hungary 
Canada  Chile  Cote d'Ivoire  Korea, Dem. Rep.  Israel 
Denmark  Colombia  Egypt, Arab Rep.  Malaysia  Portugal 
Finland  Costa Rica  Ghana  Papua New Guinea   
France Dominican  Republic  Kenya Pakistan   
Germany Ecuador  Madagascar  Philippines   
Iceland El  Salvador  Malawi Singapore   
Ireland Guatemala  Morocco  Sri  Lanka   
Italy Haiti Senegal  Thailand   
Japan Honduras  South  Africa     
Netherlands Jamaica  Togo     
New Zealand  Mexico  Tunisia     
Norway Nicaragua  Zimbabwe     
Spain Panama       
Sweden Paraguay       
Switzerland Peru       
United Kingdom  Uruguay       
United States  Venezuela       
 




Table 2.  Episodes of Output Collapses and Real GDP Growth Rates 
 
Country Year  Growth
1    Country Year Growth
1   Country Year Growth
1
Argentina 1963  -5%    Ecuador 1970  -7%    Nicaragua 1973  -4% 
Argentina 1982  -10%    El Salvador  1981  -8%    Nicaragua 1979  -27% 
Argentina 2002  -12%    Fiji 1983  -6%    Panama 1977  -2% 
Benin 1976  -5%    Finland 1992  -5%    Panama 1988  -23% 
Benin 1989  -8%    Ghana 1966  -2%    Papua New Guinea  1990  -9% 
Bolivia 1970  -2%    Ghana 1976  -5%    Papua New Guinea  1999  -5% 
Bolivia 1986  -6%    Ghana 1982  -16%    Paraguay 1986  -4% 
Botswana 1966  1%    Guatemala 1985  -4%    Peru 1983  -15% 
Brazil 1983  -6%    Haiti 1992  -16%    Peru 1989  -19% 
Brazil 1992  -3%    Hungary 1992  -6%    Philippines 1985  -8% 
Cameroon 1977  1%    Iceland 1969  0%    Senegal 1969  -12% 
Cameroon 1991  -10%    India 1966  -14%    Togo 1963  -4% 
Chile 1975  -18%    Israel 1967  -1%    Togo 1983  -10% 
Chile 1983  -8%    Jamaica 1980  -6%    Togo 1992  -14% 
Costa Rica  1982  -11%    Kenya 1970  -19%    Uruguay 1983  -14% 
Cote d'Ivoire  1982  -5%    Kenya 1985  -5%    Uruguay 2002  -12% 
Cote d'Ivoire  1990  -10%    Madagascar 1976  -7%    Venezuela, RB  1983  -5% 
Cote d'Ivoire  2003  -6%    Madagascar 2002  -16%    Venezuela, RB  1989  -14% 
Cyprus  1964  -12%  Malawi  1964  -3%  Venezuela,  RB  2002  -11% 
Cyprus 1975  -17%    Malawi 1994  -14%    Zimbabwe 1977  -5% 
Dominican Republic  1968  -2%    Malaysia 1986  -7%    Zimbabwe 1988  -10% 
Dominican Republic  1991  -3%     Mexico 1986  -6%     Zimbabwe 2003  -1% 
1 Real GDP growth rate during the year where the episode takes place. 
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Table 3.  Collapses and Booms 
Collapses 
Total  Preceded by a boom 
1, 2 or 3 years before 
Not preceded by a 
boom 
69 32 37 
Percentage 46.4%  53.6% 
Booms 
Total  Followed by a collapse 
1, 2 or 3 years after 
Not followed by 
collapses 
161 32 129 







Table 4. Panel Unit Root Tests 
 
  Fisher Test
1 Fisher  Test 
(Phillips-Perron)
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin Test  Pesaran Test 
Levin, Lin and 
Chu Test
2 












188.67 -2.360  -2.650  -2.576 
 
All auxiliary specifications include one lag of the dependent variable and a trend. 
1 The test-statistic is distributed chi-squared (146) under the null hypothesis. 
1 The test-statistic is distributed normal (0,1) under the null hypothesis.   37
Table 5. Regressions for Counterfactual TFP 
 














TFP Frontier (logs) 0.9487 Trend -0.0025
(0.0729)*** (0.0010)**
Trends: TFP Frontier (logs):
Argentina`82 -0.009 -0.0001 Argentina`82 0.612 0.509
(0.0049)* (0.0059) (0.4962) (0.5006)
Argentina`89 -0.0131 -0.0054 Argentina`89 0.404 0.2884
(0.0036)*** (0.0044) (0.4398) (0.4429)
Benin`76 -0.0164 -0.0042 Benin`76 0.4984 0.415
(0.0070)** (0.0081) (0.5243) (0.5286)
Benin`89 -0.0199 -0.0117 Benin`89 0.1938 0.0946
(0.0036)*** (0.0044)*** (0.4398) (0.4429)
Bolivia`70 -0.0016 0.0153 Bolivia`70 0.7893 0.6744
(0.0112) (0.0125) (0.6720) (0.6769)
Bolivia`86 0.0004 0.0079 Bolivia`86 0.7955 0.6596
(0.0041) (0.0049) (0.4683)* (0.4719)
Botswana`66 0.0034 0.0256 Botswana`66 1.3216 1.2272
(0.0178) (0.0191) (0.8142) (0.8178)
Brazil`83 0.0106 0.0178 Brazil`83 1.4667 1.3416
(0.0047)** (0.0056)*** (0.4948)*** (0.4991)***
Brazil`92 0.0012 0.0079 Brazil`92 1.1729 1.0251
(0.0032) (0.0039)** (0.4281)*** (0.4310)**
Cameroon`77 0.0008 0.013 Cameroon`77 0.746 0.6339
(0.0066) (0.0076)* (0.5133) (0.5176)
Cameroon`91 0.0014 0.0084 Cameroon`91 0.6451 0.4801
(0.0033) (0.0040)** (0.4295) (0.4326)
Chile`75 -0.0084 0.0066 Chile`75 0.3913 0.2642
(0.0075) (0.0086) (0.5479) (0.5538)
Chile`83 -0.0103 -0.002 Chile`83 1.0725 0.9888
(0.0047)** (0.0056) (0.4948)** (0.4991)**
Costa Rica`82 -0.0057 0.0029 Costa Rica`82 0.9468 0.8379
(0.0049) (0.0059) (0.4962)* (0.5006)*
Cote d'Ivoire`82 0.0008 0.0094 Cote d'Ivoire`82 1.1873 1.067
(0.0049) (0.0059) (0.4962)** (0.5006)**
Cote d'Ivoire`90 -0.0111 -0.0031 Cote d'Ivoire`90 0.559 0.4288
(0.0035)*** (0.0042) (0.4307) (0.4338)
Cyprus`75 0.0111 0.0251 Cyprus`75 1.4393 1.3042
(0.0075) (0.0086)*** (0.5479)*** (0.5538)**
Dominican Republic`68 -0.0028 0.0143 Dominican Republic`68 1.1528 1.05
(0.0138) (0.0151) (0.7926) (0.7972)
Dominican Republic`91 -0.0107 -0.003 Dominican Republic`91 0.7944 0.6766
(0.0033)*** (0.0040) (0.4295)* (0.4326)
Ecuador`70 0.009 0.0259 Ecuador`70 1.1407 1.0222
(0.0112) (0.0125)** (0.6720)* (0.6769)
El Salvador`81 -0.0111 -0.0015 El Salvador`81 0.3597 0.2476
(0.0052)** (0.0062) (0.4969) (0.5014)
Fiji`66 -0.0193 0.0027 Fiji`66 0.5193 0.4271
(0.0178) (0.0191) (0.8142) (0.8178)
Fiji`83 -0.0021 0.0054 Fiji`83 1.0508 0.9465
(0.0047) (0.0056) (0.4948)** (0.4991)*
Ghana`66 -0.0326 -0.0102 Ghana`66 -0.3659 -0.4627
(0.0178)* (0.0191) (0.8142) (0.8178)
Ghana`76 -0.024 -0.0117 Ghana`76 0.4226 0.3547
(0.0070)*** (0.0081) (0.5243) (0.5286)  
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Ghana`82 -0.0161 -0.0069 Ghana`82 0.3015 0.2155
(0.0049)*** (0.0059) (0.4962) (0.5006)
Guatemala`85 -0.0068 0.0006 Guatemala`85 0.7301 0.6159
(0.0043) (0.0051) (0.4765) (0.4803)
Haiti`92 -0.025 -0.0177 Haiti`92 -0.5617 -0.6603
(0.0032)*** (0.0039)*** (0.4281) (0.4310)
Hungary`92 0.0155 0.0227 Hungary`92 1.9719 1.7877
(0.0032)*** (0.0039)*** (0.4281)*** (0.4310)***
India`66 -0.0383 -0.0166 India`66 -0.1807 -0.2718
(0.0178)** (0.0191) (0.8142) (0.8178)
Israel`67 0.0071 0.0269 Israel`67 1.6283 1.5294
(0.0156) (0.0169) (0.7953)** (0.7997)*
Jamaica`80 -0.0074 0.0026 Jamaica`80 0.5965 0.4771
(0.0055) (0.0065) (0.4977) (0.5021)
Kenya`70 0.0018 0.0183 Kenya`70 0.6096 0.4871
(0.0112) (0.0125) (0.6720) (0.6769)
Kenya`85 0.0046 0.0118 Kenya`85 0.5167 0.3662
(0.0043) (0.0051)** (0.4765) (0.4803)
Madagascar`76 -0.0265 -0.0143 Madagascar`76 -0.4669 -0.5569
(0.0070)*** (0.0081)* (0.5243) (0.5286)
Malawi`94 -0.0073 -0.0003 Malawi`94 0.0312 -0.1085
(0.0030)** (0.0036) (0.4280) (0.4309)
Malaysia`86 0.0035 0.0108 Malaysia`86 1.1163 0.9865
(0.0041) (0.0049)** (0.4683)** (0.4719)**
Mexico`86 -0.004 0.0036 Mexico`86 0.8798 0.7581
(0.0041) (0.0049) (0.4683)* (0.4719)
Nicaragua`73 0.0001 0.0163 Nicaragua`73 1.1712 1.0531
(0.0087) (0.0098)* (0.5979)* (0.6038)*
Nicaragua`79 -0.0023 0.0088 Nicaragua`79 0.5942 0.4745
(0.0058) (0.0068) (0.5088) (0.5133)
Nicaragua`88 -0.021 -0.0126 Nicaragua`88 -0.3492 -0.4727
(0.0038)*** (0.0045)*** (0.4514) (0.4548)
Panama`77 0.0005 0.0124 Panama`77 0.9862 0.8756
(0.0066) (0.0076) (0.5133)* (0.5176)*
Panama`88 -0.0027 0.0054 Panama`88 0.7667 0.6264
(0.0038) (0.0045) (0.4514)* (0.4548)
Papua New Guinea`90 -0.0111 -0.0023 Papua New Guinea`90 0.7531 0.6314
(0.0035)*** (0.0042) (0.4307)* (0.4338)
Paraguay`86 -0.008 -0.0007 Paraguay`86 0.3183 0.1971
(0.0041)* (0.0049) (0.4683) (0.4719)
Peru`83 -0.0057 0.0028 Peru`83 0.8926 0.7849
(0.0047) (0.0056) (0.4948)* (0.4991)
Peru`89 -0.0118 -0.0034 Peru`89 0.5678 0.4453
(0.0036)*** (0.0044) (0.4398) (0.4429)
Philippines`85 -0.0123 -0.0049 Philippines`85 -0.0603 -0.1808
(0.0043)*** (0.0051) (0.4765) (0.4803)
Senegal`69 -0.0042 0.0123 Senegal`69 0.779 0.6667
(0.0124) (0.0136) (0.7605) (0.7656)
Togo`63 -0.006 0.0019 Togo`63 1.2496 1.1482
(0.0047) (0.0056) (0.4948)** (0.4991)**
Togo`83 -0.0099 -0.0022 Togo`83 1.0415 0.9283
(0.0032)*** (0.0039) (0.4281)** (0.4310)**
Togo`92 -0.0083 -0.0007 Togo`92 0.5125 0.4119
(0.0047)* (0.0056) (0.4948) (0.4991)
Uruguay`83 -0.0203 -0.012 Uruguay`83 0.5189 0.4308
(0.0047)*** (0.0056)** (0.4948) (0.4991)
Venezuela, RB`83 -0.0217 -0.0127 Venezuela, RB`83 0.3235 0.226
(0.0036)*** (0.0044)*** (0.4398) (0.4429)
Venezuela, RB`89 0.0078 0.0189 Venezuela, RB`89 0.7896 0.6648
(0.0066) (0.0076)** (0.5133) (0.5176)
Zimbabwe`77 0.0034 0.0104 Zimbabwe`77 0.4467 0.2789
(0.0038) (0.0045)** (0.4514) (0.4548)
Constant 17.945 5.9913 7.0581 2.8112 Observations 1808 1808 1808 1808




Table 6. Actual TFP versus Counterfactual TFP (log-differences) 
 







All Episodes: 55                         
Average number of years after collapse: 15.2                   
Mean -0.121  -0.218  -0.153  -0.194 
95% Confidence interval  -0.181   -0.061 -0.281  -0.155 -0.216 -0.090 -0.257 -0.131





Table 7. Actual TFP versus Counterfactual TFP (log-differences), by Region 
 






LAC Episodes: 28                         
Average number of years after collapse: 14.25                   
Mean  -0.187 -0.259 -0.243  -0.284 
95% Confidence interval  -0.262  -0.112  -0.351 -0.167 -0.311 -0.176  -0.351  -0.216 
t-statistic  -5.117 -5.785 -7.411  -8.598 
Asian Episodes: 5                         
Average number of years after collapse: 15.8                   
Mean 0.031  -0.052  -0.036  -0.079 
95% Confidence interval  -0.195  0.257  -0.139  0.036 -0.156  0.084  -0.203  0.044 
t-statistic 0.382  -1.639  -0.837  -1.787 
African Episodes: 19                         
Average number of years after collapse: 14.89                   
Mean  -0.068 -0.183 -0.110  -0.150 
95% Confidence interval  -0.188  0.052  -0.296 -0.070 -0.234 0.015 -0.273  -0.026 
t-statistic  -1.198 -3.392 -1.852  -2.548 
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Table 8. Threshold Effects 
 
Actual TFP versus Counterfactual TFP
 (log-differences) 
   ALL NON-LAC  LAC 
                
Large Collapses     13.82*       12.18*       14.88*   
Mean -0.356  -0.359  -0.354 
95% Confidence interval  -0.424      -0.287  -0.469      -0.248  -0.456     -0.252 
t-statistic -10.986  -8.351  -7.747 
                
Smaller Collapses     16.63*       18.93*       13.27*    
Mean -0.016  0.036  -0.079 
95% Confidence interval  -0.070     0.038  -0.042     0.114  -0.147     -0.011 
t-statistic -0.591  0.957  -2.478 
* average number of years after collapse              




Table 9. The Effects of Booms 
 
Actual TFP versus Counterfactual TFP
 (log-differences)
 
   ALL NON-LAC LAC 
Episodes preceded by booms     25        12        13    
Average number of years after collapse  14.56*      13.75*       15.30*   
Mean -0.084  -0.021  -0.146 
95%  Confidence  interval  -0.189 0.011 -0.176 0.113 -0.310 -0.001 
t-statistic -1.819  -0.333  -2.256 
Episodes not preceded by booms     30        15        15    
Average number of years after collapse  15.73*      18.33*       13.33*   
Mean -0.147  -0.031  -0.190 
95%  Confidence  interval  -0.199 -0.042 -0.173 0.094 -0.260 -0.127 
t-statistic -2.944  -0.507  -6.874         
 
      1 Based on the baseline model 
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Table 10. 3S Collapses 
Actual TFP versus Counterfactual TFP
 (log-differences) 
  





3S Episodes:12                         
Average number of years after collapse: 8.9                   
Mean -0.161  -0.213  -0.159  -0.197 
95% Confidence interval  -0.295  -0.026 -0.400 -0.025 -0.250 -0.068 -0.289 -0.106
t-statistic -2.630  -2.499  -3.833  -4.738 
3S iff Collapse Episodes: 7                         
Average number of years after collapse: 11.3                   
Mean -0.123  -0.147  -0.193  -0.231 
95% Confidence interval  -0.300  0.053 -0.316 0.023 -0.300 -0.086 -0.329 -0.133
t-statistic -1.710  -2.121  -4.421  -5.773 
Collapse Episodes post 1980: 36                      
Average number of years after collapse: 13.8                   
Mean -0.149  -0.180  -0.201  -0.243 
95% Confidence interval  -0.231  -0.067 -0.260 -0.099 -0.285 -0.117 -0.327 -0.160
t-statistic -3.720  -4.571  -4.918  -5.946 
1 Based on the baseline model




Table 11. Shocks and Collapses 
Type of Shock  Number of Events Collapses Freq.  of  shock
Freq. of collapse  
conditional on shock  Noise/Signal 
Terms of trade shock  25  3  0.01  0.12  0.24 
Int. interest rate shock  447  10  0.25  0.02  1.42 
Oil price shock  133  3  0.07  0.02  1.40 
Natural disaster  18  0  0.01  0.00  - 
Currency shock  455  21  0.25  0.05  0.67 
Banking crisis  133  5  0.07  0.04  0.83 
Debt crisis  89  7  0.05  0.08  0.38 
Political shock  49  2  0.03  0.04  0.76 
War 110  6  0.06  0.05  0.56 
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Table 12. The Effects on TFP of different shocks 
Actual TFP versus Counterfactual TFP
 (log-differences)  
Type of Shock 
 
Events  Mean  95% Confidence Interval  t-statistic 
Terms of trade shock  6  -0.131  -0.380  0.118  -1.353 
Int. interest rate shock  24  -0.156  -0.254  -0.058  -3.299 
Oil price shock  5  -0.180  -0.514  0.154  -1.498 
Natural disaster  3  -0.215  -0.313  -0.117  -9.411 
Currency shock  38  -0.134  -0.203  -0.064  -3.902 
Banking crisis  15  -0.085  -0.215  0.045  -1.397 
Debt crisis  16  -0.175  -0.272  -0.079  -3.863 
Political shock  5  -0.154  -0.628  0.320  -0.901 
War 11  -0.255  -0.377  -0.133  -4.662 




Table 13. Expected Output Loss 
   Expected  Output  Loss 
 Probability  of  Baseline  Linear trend  Country specific Country specific  Baseline incl. 
 a  collapse      absorption  absorption and trend investment effect
All 3.15%  7.99%  14.40% 10.11% 12.82% 11.99% 
LAC   3.72%  14.61%  20.24%  18.99%  22.19%  21.92% 




Table 14. Output Collapses and Differences in Investment/GDP  
Variable  Sample  Episodes  Mean  95% Confidence Interval  t-statistic 
I/GDP (constant prices)  All  55  -1.486  -3.075  0.103  -1.887 
I/GDP (constant prices)  LAC 28  -0.474  -2.421  1.472  -0.501 
I/GDP (constant prices)  AFR 21  -2.342  -5.671  0.986  -1.485 
I/GDP (constant prices)  Non-LAC 27  -2.578  -5.208  .0518  -2.023 
I/GDP (current prices)  All  55  -2.097  -3.335  -0.860  -3.402 
I/GDP (current prices)  LAC  28  -1.395  -3.173  .384  -1.612 
I/GDP (current prices)  Non-LAC  27  -2.856  -4.652  -1.060  -3.282 
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Figure 1. 
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Figure 7. Total GDP Forgone / GDP 2003 
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